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GENERAL CORPORATION LAWS:
HISTORY AND ECONOMICS
DAVID MCBRIDE*
“Where there is no bread, there is no Law; where there is no Law, there is no bread.”

1

“[T]wo intellectual inventions of the Renaissance, double-entry bookkeeping and the
corporation, proved vital to the development of European civilization in the New
2
World . . . .”

I
INTRODUCTION
The symbiosis of law and business is often noted, less often truly
appreciated—until either law or economic growth is absent—and much
debated. The relationship of corporate law to national economics is real,
appreciated, and being hotly debated on this sixtieth anniversary of the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA). The financial crises, scandals, and
economic losses of the first decade of the twenty-first century have caused many
to question the efficacy of state corporate laws—like the MBCA and the
Delaware General Corporation Law—and advocate fundamental change,
deemed to be “reform” of those laws.3
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1. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 325 (2006)
(citing RABBI ELEAZAR BEN AZARIAH, CHAPTERS OF THE FATHERS).
2. JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH: THE EPIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN
ECONOMIC POWER 9 (2004).
3. The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] contains several provisions that treat
corporate governance, including most prominently authorization for the SEC to adopt a “proxy access”
system, Dodd-Frank Act § 971, and “say on pay” and other executive compensation provisions. DoddFrank Act §§ 951–957. For differing views on proxy access, compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst,
Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329 (2010), with Joseph A. Grundfest,
The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361 (2010).
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There are important and legitimate questions being raised about corporate
law and governance.4 But much of the debate has centered on the appropriate
level of government to address the subject—whether the law should be the
domain of the states, the federal government, international bodies, or some
combination of all of these. This article will leave those arguments aside, for
they have been better addressed by others.5 Rather, this article will briefly
address three questions: (1) what are the purposes of the corporate law (or
other entity law), as reflected by the history of such organizations and how well
have those laws fulfilled those purposes; (2) what economic phenomena have
contributed to the success or failure of those laws; and (3) what are the
implications of these economic observations for corporate and entity law?
II
THE HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND SUCCESS OF THE CORPORATE FORM
Within the past 150 years, non-governmental corporations have become the
principal social institution by which business and economic activity has been
conducted—whether for-profit, not-for-profit, or for charitable purposes. It was
not always so:
The word [corporation] refers to any association of individuals bound together into a
corpus, a body sharing a common purpose in a common name. In the past, that
purpose had usually been communal or religious; boroughs, guilds, monasteries, and
bishoprics were the earliest European manifestations of the corporate form. They all
owed their existence, and the privileges stemming from a corporate charter, to an act
of a sovereign authority. It was assumed, as it is still in nonprofit corporations, that the
corporate body earned its charter by serving the public good. The same thinking
applied in the chartering of joint-stock companies in the age of exploration and
6
colonization.

Before the Civil War in the United States, the corporate charter generally
was perceived as a privilege granted only by a special act of the legislature for

4. See generally Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock
Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1 (2009); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race
for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. REV. 685 (2009); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL:
AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 151–55 (2010); RICHARD
A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 97–
99 (2009).
5. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington:
Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079 (2008); Sean J.
Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS.
LAW. 1 (2005); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 953 (2003); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform,
29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); David
A. Skeel, Jr., Icarus and American Corporate Regulation, 61 BUS. LAW. 155 (2005); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2006);
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1573 (2005).
6. ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE
GILDED AGE 5–6 (1982).
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purposes deemed to be in the public interest.7 Incorporation was not yet
deemed a right available on application by any private enterprise: “The earliest
charters were thus bestowed on insurance companies, commercial banks, canal,
dock, and highway companies . . . .”8 These corporations were not exclusively
profit-seeking associations, but were quasi-public agencies of the state,
oftentimes “mixed enterprises” in which public funds were invested with private
funds for needed internal improvements to transportation facilities, such as
highways and canals.9
The situation began to change with the economic growth, both in Europe
and in the United States, during the nineteenth century, and, in the case of the
United States, particularly during the period from the Civil War to the First
World War (1860 through 1914). In the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, the American economy was characterized by individually and familyowned enterprises.10 In the entire colonial period, only seven companies were
incorporated in the British North American colonies.11 In just the last four years
of the eighteenth century, however, 335 businesses incorporated in the new
United States.12 “Organizations with more than a hundred employees were a
rarity. By the time of the Civil War, however, several railroads were employing
thousands, and industrial companies were growing as well.”13 In 1811, New York
became the first state with a general incorporation statute, but it was available
only to corporations manufacturing textiles, glass, metals, and paint. The
earliest legislations permitting formation of corporations for any lawful,
specified purpose were adopted by Connecticut in 1837 and Iowa in 1846.14
The corporate form had numerous advantages over non-corporate forms.
The most critical was the doctrine of limited liability. Beginning with the
railroads in the mid-1800s and accelerating after the Civil War, it became
necessary to raise large sums of capital for growing enterprises. The pooling of
small investments by numerous investors became an important means of raising
those funds, but investors would not be willing to make small investments in
enterprises they would not control, if doing so exposed them to unlimited
liability for the debts of the enterprise. The limited liability of stockholders was
critical, not only to the development of the corporation, but also to the
economic development of Europe and the United States.15 Other advantages of
the corporate form included the ability to utilize “modern” management
techniques, which were being developed during the late nineteenth and early

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
GORDON, supra note 2, at 228.
Id.
Id. at 228–29.
Id. at 228.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (2008).
See GORDON, supra note 2, at 9–11, 228–29.
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twentieth centuries by professional managers who were not owners of the
businesses,16 perpetual existence, and the ability to merge.17 The corporate form
also was utilized as a means to restrain competition and coordinate vertical and
horizontal integration in many industries.18
The most significant disadvantage of the corporate form is the well-known
separation of ownership from operating control of the business.19 This created
the classic problem of management operating the entity for its personal benefit
and gave rise to the imposition of fiduciary duties. This problem would pose the
most significant threat to the efficacy of the corporate form because trust is so
essential to the maintenance of all forms of cooperative human activity. The
separation of management from ownership also gave rise to a need for better
accounting, as stockholders wanted timely information with which to evaluate
management, and management was tempted to use accounting to make its
performance appear better.20 Beginning in the 1880s, “[t]he big Wall Street
banks, which were becoming ever more powerful, and the New York Stock
Exchange increasingly required companies that . . . wanted to be listed on the
exchange to conform to what would come to be called ‘generally accepted
accounting principles’ and to have their books certified by” a newly-created
profession—the certified public accountant, first legislatively recognized in New
York in 1896.21
By the end of the nineteenth century, the laws governing incorporation had
evolved to respond to the needs of the economy and the objectives of the
business and financial worlds. No longer a privilege, incorporation became a
right available to the exuberant businesspersons and financiers of the era. In
essence, the corporation had evolved from a specialized entity, created for the
particular ends of the “sovereign,” to an entity created to facilitate new and
ever evolving forms of organization needed by the economy.22 However, under
either structure, the corporation was designed for the purpose of facilitating
common action, not restraining or prohibiting it. Not surprisingly, the laws that
evolved to facilitate this form increasingly evidenced the characteristic of being
“empowering” statutes, not regulatory statutes.23 The essential caveats to this
empowerment were the maintenance of trust, reflected in the fiduciary duties

16. See TRACHTENBERG, supra note 6, at 83–86.
17. GORDON, supra note 2, at 229.
18. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 6, at 83–86.
19. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 229–30.
20. Id. at 230.
21. Id. at 231–32.
22. By the end of the nineteenth century, the laws treating the corporate form had “converged” in
providing five basic features that characterized the corporate form: (1) full legal personality, including
the ability to contract; (2) limited liability for owners and managers; (3) shared ownership by investors
of capital; (4) delegated management; and (5) transferable shares. Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439–40 (2001).
23. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (2008).
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imposed by the law, and the need for stockholders to be informed about the
financial affairs of the corporation.
From this history, it is evident that the legal entity known as the corporation
had become the favored form of organization for larger businesses, and that
larger businesses were becoming a greater percentage of the economy.24 This
phenomenon leads to several conclusions. First, the essential purpose of a
corporation—or any other form of legal entity—is to facilitate collective action
by individuals. It allows various persons to make varying contributions to the
collective effort. Second, the expansion of the corporate form, from
governmental to quasi-governmental to private enterprise, evidences the
success of this form of organization and its consequent proliferation. The
creation of new types of legal entities has continued this proliferation.25 Third,
while some may question the benefits of growth or the allocation of its benefits
among groups within society, it would seem no one could reasonably question
the success of the corporate form in promoting growth and economic
innovation.26
III
FACTORS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE
There are a host of reasons for the economic success of corporations, most
of which are not directly tied to the law by which corporations are formed, but

24. By 1904, “about three hundred industrial corporations had won control over more than two
fifths of all manufacturing in the country, affecting the operations of about four fifths of the nation’s
industries.” TRACHTENBERG, supra note 6, at 4.
25. During the past decade, the limited liability company (LLC) has become the favored form of
business organization, except with respect to publicly-traded entities, where the corporation remains
the favored legal entity. See generally Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States
Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 459 (2010).
26. See generally GORDON, supra note 2; FRIEDMAN, supra note 1; DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY (2002). The
rate at which human economic production has grown has skyrocketed in the past 250 years. According
to Berkeley economist, J. Bradford Long, per person gross domestic product (GDP) in a huntergatherer society of 15,000 years ago was approximately ninety dollars, increasing to $150 in the
economy of the ancient Greeks in 1000 B.C. and to $180 in 1750. However, subsequent to 1750, there
has been a thirty-seven-fold increase in GDP per person to $6,600, with the wealthiest societies
producing well above that level. It took 99.4% of economic history to reach the wealth levels of huntergatherers, 0.59% of that history to double that level by 1750, and then just 0.01% of that history for
global wealth levels to reach present levels. Over ninety-seven percent of humanity’s wealth was
created in just the last 0.1% of our history. ERIC BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH:
EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY AND THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 9–11 (2006). As described
by economic historian, David Landes, “the Englishman of 1750 was closer in material things to Caeser’s
legionnaires than to his own great-grand-children.” DAVID S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS:
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO
THE PRESENT 5 (1969). This period of incredible growth obviously was driven by the industrial
revolution and technological advances, but many of those developments were facilitated by and utilized
by corporations.
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rather, are a product of the strengths and weaknesses of the individuals who
participate in or contribute to the enterprise and the social, market, and
governmental environment in which they operate. But this article will focus
upon several aspects of economic theory that seem important to the success of
the corporate form or any form of organization.
To understand how and why the corporate laws may have contributed to the
incredible growth of the past 250 years—and to understand how they may
continue to do so in the future—an understanding of how and why that growth
occurred is helpful. In The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity and the
Radical Remaking of Economics, Eric Beinhocker27 offers a survey and
synthesis for the layperson of recent developments in economic theory that
provides some explanation for this economic history.28 He argues that:
[W]ealth creation is the product of a simple, but profoundly powerful, three-step
formula—differentiate, select and amplify—the formula of evolution . . . . Evolution is
an algorithm; it is an all-purpose formula for innovation, a formula that, through its
29
special brand of trial and error, creates new designs and solves difficult problems.

The biological evolution described by Darwin—which involves
differentiation by genetic mutation, natural selection, and amplification by
genetic inheritance—is a type of evolution, but DNA is not the only arena in
which evolution operates.30 Biological and economic systems are subclasses of a
more general and universal class of evolutionary systems, and researchers
27. Eric Beinhocker’s bio reads as follows:
Eric Beinhocker is a senior fellow at the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), McKinsey
& Company’s economics research arm, where he leads research on economic,
management, and public policy issues. He was previously a partner at McKinsey and a
leader in its Strategy Practice. His career has bridged both the business and academic
worlds. He has been a software CEO, a venture capitalist, and an executive director of
the Corporate Executive Board; at McKinsey he has served clients in a broad range of
industries, including telecoms, computing, pharmaceuticals, and aerospace. He has
also held research appointments at the Harvard Business School and the MIT Sloan
School and has been a visiting scholar at the Santa Fe Institute. He is a graduate of
Dartmouth College and the MIT Sloan School where he was the Henry Ford II
Scholar.
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/perspective/biography/eric.asp (last visited
Nov. 8, 2010).
28. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26.
29. Id. at 11–12. Others have argued that “unguided evolutionary process may, or may not, lead to
economic efficiency. Unfortunately, natural selection does not necessarily choose the firms (or
institutions) that are the best for the long run. One of the main criticisms of financial markets is that
they have become increasingly shortsighted.” STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at 273. Beinhocker, however,
does not advocate for an unguided evolutionary process. As noted below, Beinhocker believes that the
government may play an important role in establishing the environment in which evolutionary
processes operate—either by setting goals or by setting constraints.
30. See BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 192. Beinhocker describes an algorithm as “a recipe that
takes some set of inputs (for example, flour, eggs, sugar, butter), mechanically works them through
some process (for example, stir together well, bake at 350°F or 175°C for fifteen minutes), and, if the
instructions are followed, reliably produces some set of outputs (for example, cookies).” Beinhocker
defines substrates as “the material or information on which the algorithm acts,” and argues that
“evolution is an algorithm that is substrate neutral. It takes information about the designs of things and
mindlessly grinds that information through a process.” Id.

MCBRIDE

Winter 2011]

12/31/2010

HISTORY AND ECONOMICS

7

believe that there are general laws of evolutionary systems.31 Beinhocker notes
Daniel Dennett’s assertion that “evolution [is] a general-purpose algorithm for
creating ‘design without a designer.’”32
Evolution creates or discovers designs through a process of trial and error—
a variety of candidate designs are created and tried out in the environment; the
successful designs are retained and replicated.33 An evolutionary process results
in the emergence of greater structure and complexity over time, as evolution
builds on the successes of the past to create novel designs for the future.34 As the
world changes, so too do the designs change and adapt.35
As Beinhocker explains, “[t]he notion that the economy is an evolutionary
system is a radical idea, especially because it directly contradicts much of the
standard theory in economics developed over the past one hundred years.”36
Since the late nineteenth century, the organizing paradigm of economics has
been that the economy is an equilibrium system, essentially a system at rest.37
That economic paradigm was borrowed from another field of science:
Newtonian physics.38 But while physics has moved far beyond the Newtonian
universe, economics has not.39 The new paradigm in physics—as well as other
areas of science—is complex systems.40 Those are systems of many dynamically
interacting parts, in which the micro-level interactions of the parts or particles
lead to the emergence of macro-level patterns of behavior or emergent
characteristics not observed at the micro level.41 When the parts or particles of
the system have the ability to process information and adapt to their
environment—Beinhocker refers to such parts or particles as agents—the
resulting system is known as a “complex adaptive system.”42 Evolutionary

31. Id. at 12 (citing JOHN H. HOLLAND, ADAPTION IN NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS
(1992); L.D. WHITLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF GENETIC ALGORITHMS (1993); MELANIE MITCHELL, AN
INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ALGORITHMS (1996); L.F. LANDWEBER & E. WINFREE, EVOLUTION AS
COMPUTATION (2002); J.P. CRUTCHFIELD & P. SCHUSTER, EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS: EXPLORING
THE INTERPLAY OF SELECTION, ACCIDENT, NEUTRALITY, AND FUNCTION (2003)).
32. Id. at 13 (citing DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA 28–34, 48–60 (1995);
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986)). Beinhocker’s description of evolution
borrows heavily from the work of Daniel Dennett, an evolutionary theorist and director of the Center
for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, and from Richard Dawkins, the Oxford evolutionary theorist.
33. Id. at 14.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 16. Beinhocker notes that viewing the economy as an evolutionary system is “radical”
when compared to traditional economic theory, but it is not new. In fact, Darwin’s concept of evolution
was sparked by Robert Malthus’s economic writings, and, during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, economists Thorstein Veblen, Alfred Marshall, Joseph Schumpter, and Friedrich
Hayek examined the relationship between economics and evolutionary theory. Id. at 16–17.
37. Id. at 17.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 18.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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systems are merely one type of complex adaptive system, and some social
scientists have wondered whether economies might be another such system.43
The study of economic systems as complex adaptive systems or evolutionary
systems has created new schools of economic thought, known as “complexity
economics” or “evolutionary economics.”44
The economic evolution described by Beinhocker “is not a single process,
but rather the result of three interlinked processes.”45 The first of these linked
processes is the evolution of physical technology, such as bronze-making
techniques, steam engines, and microchips.46 The second process is the evolution
of social technologies, or “ways of organizing people to do things,” such as the
rule of law, money, joint-stock companies, and venture capital.47 The two are
equally important, and “coevolve with each other.”48 An example is that the
invention of the spinning frame (physical) made it economical to organize clothmaking in large factories (social), which, in turn, promoted development of
water power, steam, and electricity (physical).49 Finally, before the innovations
of physical technologies and social technologies have an impact on the world,
businesses must be formed to provide the goods and services created by these
technologies to a marketplace. “Businesses are themselves a form of design,”
integrating “strategy, organizational structure, management processes, culture,
and a host of other factors.”50
These three evolutionary processes: physical technology, social technology,
and business organization interact and coevolve. What emerges is a complex
adaptive system that has three key characteristics: (1) many dynamically
interacting parts, (2) the parts have the ability to adapt to changes around them,
and (3) micro-level interactions of parts or particles lead to the emergence of
macro-level patterns of behavior different from the micro patterns that underlie
the system.51 Perhaps most significantly, this complex adaptive system is not a
system designed from the “top-down,” but rather emerges from the “bottomup.”52 The existing global economy is just such a complex adaptive system,
“orders of magnitude more complex than any other physical or social structure
ever built by humankind.”53
43. Id. at 18–19.
44. Id. at 19. See also Ulrich Witt, Evolutionary Economics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008).
45. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 15.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 15–16. Beinhocker borrows these concepts from the evolutionary economist Richard
Nelson of Columbia University. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); RICHARD R. NELSON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH (1996).
49. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 16.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 18.
52. Id. at 18–19.
53. Id. at 6.
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But lest this all sound entirely too mechanistic, there is another aspect of the
process, and it involves that greatest of mysteries—human nature. Human
nature is an inevitable ingredient in the evolution of these designs; it is a critical
factor in their success or failure.54 These evolutionary processes are all driven—
at least in part—by human efforts to seek new and better ways of meeting our
needs or desires. Beinhocker asks what spurs these efforts, and here is his
answer:
The answer lies in the magic of non-zero-sum games . . . . [In] zero-sum games . . . one
person’s gain is another person’s loss . . . . [In] non-zero-sum games . . . both people
can be made better off by cooperating. Cooperation in non-zero-sum games has a
1+1=3 logic, whereby if you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours, and together we can do
something neither can do as well on our own and we both benefit. Non-zero-sum
cooperation is one of those Good Tricks of survival that has been widely employed by
biological evolution. Dogs hunt in packs, termites collectively build mounds, fish swim
55
in schools, and, like most primates, members of Homo sapiens live in groups.

The search for better ways of organizing ourselves—better social
technologies—is the search for forms of organization “that enable people to
play and capture the benefits of non-zero-sum games.”56 The success of social
organizations in accomplishing this result turns on three critical factors. First,
the organization must provide the potential for non-zero-sum payoffs or gains.57
These gains can be produced by a plethora of means including technological
improvements, division of labor, exchanging different contributions (labor from
some, capital from others), increasing returns to scale, and risk-sharing.58
Second, people must share the benefits to be gained from the organization.59
For people to have an incentive to cooperate, they must receive some share of
the spoils, otherwise, cooperation collapses and the non-zero-sum gains
evaporate.60 It is here that the tension between selfish interest and collective
interest is most intense, and this is the sphere in which gains that physical
54. Subsequent to the financial crisis that began in 2007, classical economic theory and “freemarket” theories have come under substantial attack. One of the criticisms is that classical economic
theory is based upon unrealistic assumptions about human behavior. In particular, classical economics
assumes human agents that use complex deductive calculations to assess self-interest, make no
cognitive errors and have no cognitive bias, have complete information, and have no need to learn or
adapt. See generally id. at 115–19. See also STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at 249–53; POSNER, supra note 4, at
79–116.
55. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 265–66. (citing SAMUEL BOWLES, MICROECONOMICS:
BEHAVIOR, INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION (2004); HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A
PROBLEM-CENTERED INTRODUCTION TO MODELING STRATEGIC INTERACTION (2000); H. PEYTON
YOUNG, INDIVIDUAL STRATEGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
INSTITUTIONS (1998); ROBERT ALEXROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION (1997); BRIAN
SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984) for the centrality of “game theory” to an understanding of the evolution of
social norms and institutions). See also R. WRIGHT, NON-ZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY
(2000).
56. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 266.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 266–67.
59. Id. at 267.
60. Id.
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technologies make possible might be lost. There are two characteristics that
promote a sharing of gains in a manner that promotes continuing cooperation:
trust and communication.61 Both are critical because the sharing of gains
requires trust in the reciprocal nature of the cooperation and communication
about how the gains can be maximized and shared.62 Trust, especially among
strangers, is facilitated by the rule of law. But law cannot replace a lack of
trust.63
Third, the social organization must have a means of dealing with those who
“cheat” by seeking to capture the benefits of cooperation without contributing
themselves (the “free rider”) or by seeking to capture the benefits without
sharing those benefits with others who have contributed.64 Beinhocker notes
that “[t]he incentive to cheat means that cooperation is inherently difficult to
achieve and potentially unstable even once attained.”65 Psychological research
demonstrates that
the consistent and deep-rooted nature of human cooperative-reciprocity behavior.
Evolution has steered us in a direction whereby we are naturally inclined to be
cooperative to capture the riches of non-zero-sum games. Nevertheless, it has also
equipped us with a sensitivity to cheating, expectations of fairness, and a willingness to
66
mete out punishment to those we believe have crossed the line.

Human history has evidenced the evolution of increasingly complex and
sophisticated social structures for addressing these three prerequisites of nonzero-sum interaction.67 From the family, to tribes, to agricultural settlements,
and to nation-states and modern corporations, the trend has been to ever-larger
organizations for cooperative activity encompassing greater numbers and wider
geography.68 Prevailing social technology can be decisive of whether a social
organization can realize and perpetuate non-zero-sum gains.69 One study has
demonstrated that the most significant factors in the creation of wealth are not
natural resources, sophisticated physical technology, or competent
government.70 The most important factors are the rule of law, the existence of
property rights, a well-organized banking system, economic transparency, a lack
of corruption, and other social factors that promote non-zero-sum gains.71
The modern corporation is the largest and most complex non-state
institution in the world. It was made possible by technologies that allow for
communication across vast space and the ability to process substantial amounts

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 274.
See id. at 267–68.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 268–70.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 269.
See id. at 270–75.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id.
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of information. It integrates a host of social technologies including money,
accounting, and limited liability. Some cognitive scientists even believe that
such organizations are capable of having emergent, cognitive capabilities that
no individual in the organization has and that are greater than the sum of all the
people within the organization.72 Ironically, Beinhocker states that
[British Petroleum (BP)], with its 103,000 employees in over a hundred countries
around the world, is a marvel of human cooperation. The vast majority of its people
have never met and never will meet, but are bound together in a web of social
structures, norms, protocols, legal structures, and incentives that enable them to work
together for a common purpose. If one extends that web of cooperation beyond BP’s
immediate employees to include its 1.3 million shareholders and thousands of supplier
and other partner companies, then the scale of a social structure such as BP becomes
73
even more remarkable.

Yet, BP’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico during the Spring and Summer of
2010 evidences the ability of such organizations to create massive harm as well
as good.
The foregoing analysis is, of necessity, very generalized and surveys
developing areas of study and analysis. Nonetheless, this focus upon
evolutionary or complexity economic analysis and upon game theory may
contribute to a better understanding of the attributes of corporate and entity
law that will facilitate reaching societal or collective goals.
IV
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE LAW
There are three main conclusions from Beinhocker’s survey that may have
potential implications for corporate and entity law:
1. The creation of wealth—and the accomplishment of any human
goals—are a function of evolutionary processes that create differing
designs or structures, select for the design that is most fit for the
environment in which it operates, and allow for the amplification or
replication of that design. Organizational structures are one such
design.
2. Economic systems are complex adaptive systems that were not and
cannot be created from the top-down, but evolved from the bottomup. The systems are far too complex to be managed by any singular
source or authority because no one can know how all the parts work
together. The parts of the system also are capable of evolving and
adapting to meet its defined goals or humans needs.
3. Social organizations that evolve successfully will be those that
promote the realization of non-zero-sum gains. This requires the

72. Id. at 275–76. (citing JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A
SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003)).
73. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 276.
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intelligence and ingenuity to develop technologies and organizations
that create such gains, it requires an allocation of gains in a manner
satisfactory to promoting and preserving the cooperation of those
needed to realize the gains, and it requires a system to reliably punish
those who cheat.
Each of these observations has some significant, if not surprising,
implications for the corporate law.
A. Allowing for Evolution
Legal structures that allow for evolutionary processes are important to the
success and survival of any social structure. Freedom to experiment is important
to fostering this process. The corporate law should allow the flexibility to
develop new social technologies and adapt to change, so long as that flexibility
does not sacrifice some equally important value. This characteristic has been
part of the empowering philosophy of both the MBCA and the Delaware
General Corporation Law.74 With respect to many of the ongoing debates about
what form of corporate governance is most advantageous, evolutionary theory
suggests that the participants in corporate organizations ought to have the
flexibility to experiment with different structures and resolve those issues for
themselves. While the general corporation law contains default structures that
operate in the absence of a conscious decision to vary them, the ability to vary
those provisions is valuable.75
For example, stockholders ought to have the ability to experiment with
structures that enhance their ability to exercise some control over the
organization. The board-centered structure that is part of both the MBCA and
the Delaware General Corporate Law ought to be subject to change and
experimentation.76 The empowering philosophy of these statutes ought to not be

74. Various theorists have argued that free contracting in a competitive system will promote the
general welfare. See generally FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). This proposition has been applied to competition among
states for incorporations. See generally ROBERT ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
LAW (1993). But see Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1778–81 (2002). The financial crisis of the past
three years has generated substantial criticism of “efficient market” theory as the method for achieving
or measuring the common good. Evolutionary or complexity economics may lead to certain conclusions
also supported by efficient market theory, but based upon a different economic analysis. Beinhocker
questions efficient market theories based upon traditional economic analysis. BEINHOCKER, supra note
26, at 21–75. See also STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at 239–48, 265–71.
75. For example, there are different models for the structure of corporate boards. The same model
may not be the best model at all times for all corporations. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 694–95. The
point of evolutionary theory is that no one can determine a priori what is the best model, even for most
firms, most of the time. Rather, boards operate as part of a complex adaptive system in which the
fitness of the model will be determined by an evolutionary process operating from the ground up.
76. There is a considerable debate over the roles of stockholders and directors. For example, there
is a plethora of criticism of stockholder activism, contending that stockholders are conflicted in their
goals, short-term oriented, and uninformed. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of
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limited to empowering boards of directors. It also ought to extend to
empowering stockholders, so long as other important values are not sacrificed.
Similarly, in the longstanding debate between stockholder interest and
stakeholder interest, the corporate law should be flexible enough to allow for
experimentation, allowing other interests to be considered, if desired by the
participants. In addition, the law ought to allow flexibility when selecting the
purposes for which the corporation is created, recognizing that for-profit
activities are not the only ends to be served by the corporate form of
organization.77 In essence, evolution will test the fitness of the various and
competing theories advanced with respect to corporate governance.
There are limitations on the principle of flexibility and two are worth noting
here. As explained below, the fiduciary duty of loyalty applicable to those who
manage the assets and property of others is important to maintaining the type
of organization that can create non-zero-sum gains. Experimentation that would
jeopardize the existence and enforcement of those duties should be carefully
examined. If game theory is correct, forms of social organizations that
undermine trust are inherently dysfunctional in the long run. In addition, forms
of organization that limit communication between corporate constituencies—
especially between stockholders, managers, and directors—operate to hinder
the realization of non-zero-sum gains. Experimentation that would jeopardize
the ability of stockholders and directors to obtain information about the

Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789 (2007); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law:
The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006). Others argue that stockholder activism is
associated with better long-term performance of the corporation. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The
Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97 (2010)
(exhaustively reviewing the literature critical of stockholder activism and the literature demonstrating
the benefits of stockholder activism); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 695 (citing Harold Demsetz &
Kenneth Lehm, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON.
1155, 1161 (1985) (arguing that corporations in which individual investors or small groups of investors
own large blocks of stock perform better because the owners are good monitors)).
77. The financial crisis of the past three years—and especially the government assistance provided
to publicly-held corporations—has posed a fundamental challenge to the prevailing theories of
corporate structure and purpose. Those events have challenged the assumption that the costs of the
failure of corporate governance are only borne by the participants in creating, managing, and owning
those entities. If corporate governance was a causative factor in the financial crisis—a point that is hotly
debated—then that failure imposed tremendous “external costs” on persons other than directors,
managers, and stockholders. STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at 15–19; POSNER, supra note 4, at 106–08, 114–15.
In light of those costs and the resulting rescue efforts, it is not surprising that profound questions are
being raised about the ultimate purposes to be served by the creation and operation of business entities.
Of the six dominant theories of corporate governance, four are premised on long-term profit
maximization for stockholders as the primary, if not exclusive, objective of the corporate enterprise,
while two of the theories allow for the consideration of the interest of other constituencies or broader
societal interests. J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice,
27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 315–26 (2010). One commentator has proposed that “shareholder primacy”—
profit maximization for the enterprise and stockholders—be a default setting that would give way in the
case of an emergency, such as the financial crisis of 2008. See generally Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary
Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice During a
National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661 (2010).
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corporation—subject to important confidentiality and trade-secret concerns—
should be carefully examined.
Another important caveat about flexibility relates to the phenomenon of
“too big to fail.” Evolutionary processes necessarily involve change that is
adaptive and change that is dysfunctional. The theory is that the process will
“select” the successes from the failures. But what if the universe of
organizations is so limited that the failure of one organization will result in the
failure of that entire segment of the economy—or even of the entire economy?
Biological evolution produces species that become extinct as well as those that
proliferate. The answer to this paradox is not simple, and this issue poses a
significant challenge to the utility of evolutionary economics, which
presupposes a diversity of business forms on which selection for fitness
operates. Nonetheless, freezing innovation and change by selecting a single
form of organization deemed to be the “best” seems both hopeless and illadvised. Changes in the environment in which corporations operate, including
the demands and needs they are attempting to meet to be successful, will never
end. Corporations must be able to adapt to those changes, and that adaption
will involve experimentation. Nonetheless, experimentation that would produce
catastrophic failure is not a prescription for accomplishing any societal goals.
The options would seem to be limited to: (1) minimize the size of the
institutions so that failure would not be systemic, (2) manage the failure so that
the resources of the corporation are re-deployed in new organizations without
too great a systemic cost to the economy and without engendering “moral
hazard,” or (3) allow failure with whatever consequences result. As of yet, it
does not appear any satisfactory solution has been found.78 But a respect for
innovation and experimentation cannot ignore the size and concentration of
economic—as well as governmental—power and resources. That very
concentration may stifle the evolutionary process.
B. The Illusion of Managing a Complex Adaptive System
The global economy undoubtedly is a complex adaptive system. The ability
of any lawmakers to control or manage that system is not simply limited by the
confines of territorial jurisdiction; it also is limited by the ability to understand
the interactions of the multitude of factors affecting its operation. Nonetheless,
this conclusion does not mean the system ought to be left to operate in
whatever fashion it does. Beinhocker suggests a distinction that may be helpful
in this regard:
Policies that get the government involved in differentiating, selecting, and amplifying
[physical or social technologies and business organizations] would be seen as

78. Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a new insolvency process for large, interconnected
companies whose failure creates a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States.
However, there is serious question whether the process created by Title II is sufficient to avoid the
adverse and systemic damage that supposedly was prevented by the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP).
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interfering in economic evolution and have all the problems discussed in the critique
of socialist economies . . . . In contrast, policies that shape the fitness environment,
while leaving . . . selection and amplification [of technologies and business
79
organizations] to market mechanisms, are a different matter.

This prescription would leave the structure and form of business
organizations to the evolutionary processes allowed by flexible business
organization laws, while allowing government regulation to set the parameters
within which such evolutionary and market processes would operate. Any
evolutionary process operates within an environment that sets the parameters
by which fitness is tested. Cold environments produce certain physical traits
that promote survival, and hot environments produce other physical traits that
will promote survival. What will succeed depends upon the external
environment in which the evolutionary process operates and to which that
process must adapt. The law may establish the “environment” in which social
organizations, including corporations, operate by defining the outcomes being
sought and the constraints in which the evolutionary process will operate.
Setting such parameters does not necessarily result in losing the benefits of an
evolutionary process. The law may define some of the ends, and the means to
reach those ends will be created by an evolutionary process. This paradigm also
may reconcile the competing, and sometimes conflicting, roles of federal law (or
multinational law) and state entity law. The state law allows for the
evolutionary process of design creation and selection; federal or multinational
law sets the environment in which that process operates, thereby setting the
parameters by which “fitness” will be measured.
C. Non-zero-sum Games and Fiduciary Duties
Game theory postulates that social organizations that promote trust and
communication between cooperating individuals will better realize the gains
possible from non-zero-sum interactions and better sustain such interactions.
There are a number of differing groups that must cooperate to produce an
effective corporation, but the relationships of most concern to the corporate law
are those between (1) officers and directors, (2) stockholders and officers and
directors, and (3) among stockholders. A lack of trust and communication
between these groups will presumably undermine the ability of the corporation
to produce gain.
Game theory also postulates that social organizations must have the ability
to identify and discipline cheaters—those who do not reciprocate in sharing
benefits or those who “free ride” on the work of others. The precise “bargain”
that cooperating parties may strike—and consequently the definition of
cheating—may vary from organization to organization. According to John Nash
(profiled in the popular book and movie, A Beautiful Mind), the bargain struck
for dividing the gains from non-zero-sum interactions depends upon how much
each of the parties values the benefits of the deal, and what alternatives are
79. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 426 (emphasis in original).
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available to each of the parties.80 The trade is made “at the point at which no
one has any incentive to change position, given the actions of the other. This
point became known as the Nash equilibrium.”81
The most critical component of the corporate law for establishing and
enforcing trust between directors and officers, on the one hand, and
stockholders, on the other, is the fiduciary duty of loyalty. The MBCA codifies
that duty in sections 8.31 and 8.42—which obligate directors and officers,
respectively, to act “in the manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation”82—and in subchapter F, which deals with
directors’ conflict-of-interest transactions. The Delaware law imposes similar
fiduciary duties on directors and officers, although those duties are developed
in the case law and not by statutory codification. In both cases, the corporate
law does not allow those fiduciary duties to be modified or eliminated, and in
the case of the Delaware General Corporation Law, a director’s liability for
money damages for breaches of such a duty may not be eliminated.83 The
MBCA is somewhat more permissive in allowing directors to be exculpated
from monetary liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty.84
Game theory suggests that laws that undermine the obligations of the duty
of loyalty could undermine trust and, ultimately, the cooperation necessary to
any successful social organization. To a certain extent, the parties may be able
to contract as to their expectations of each other, thereby establishing trust
through the mechanism of compliance with contractual undertakings.85
However, such contractual arrangements are more effective if they are the
result of real bargaining and are truly reciprocal. Contracts of adhesion that are
so one-sided as to destroy any sense of reciprocity are more likely to undermine
trust rather than promote it.86

80. Id. at 267.
81. Id. at 267–68 (emphases omitted).
82. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.31, 8.42 (2008).
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
84. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2008).
85. See generally Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in
Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221 (2009).
86. The proposition that contractual agreements—either real or hypothetical—may be either the
best utilitarian outcome or the fairest outcome is hotly debated. See, e.g., J. William Callison & Allan
W. Vestal, Contractarianism and Its Discontents: Reflections on Unincorporated Business Organization
Law Reform, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 493 (2009). In order to preserve the long-term cooperation
essential to creating non-zero-sum gains, the contract should produce a division of gains deemed by the
participants in the exchange as minimally fair. As one commentator has noted, “actual contracts carry
moral weight insofar as they realize two ideals—autonomy and reciprocity.” MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 144 (2009). The autonomy of the contracting parties may
be undermined by their unequal bargaining positions, and the reciprocity of the contract may be
undermined by a host of factors including the relative knowledge and judgment of the parties. See id. at
144–51. The long-term “fitness” of a purely contractual model for legal entities may depend upon how
close or far the contract is from the ideals of autonomy and reciprocity. Two factors in evaluating such
matters are the size of the enterprise and the role of the parties in setting the terms of the contract.
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The need for trust also is critical in the relationship between officers and
directors. Directors are largely dependent upon officers to provide the
information necessary for decisions, to present the risks and benefits of various
options in an even-handed and candid manner, and to alert the directors as to
issues that need to be addressed. Officers determined to control the decisions
made by the board can attempt to do so by limiting information, biasing the
analysis of options, or failing to alert the board to relevant issues. In such an
environment, it is difficult for the board process to be meaningful, and, if the
board perceives it is operating in such an environment, the board’s relationship
either with the officers or the stockholders will be undermined. The relationship
with officers will be undermined because the board will no longer trust the
information or analysis being provided. The relationship with the stockholders
will be undermined because the stockholders may perceive the board as not
protecting their interest, but merely “rubber-stamping” the proposals made by
management.
Finally, the need for trust among stockholders is an increasing issue. The
default—and largely mandated—structure of the corporation is built upon the
model of stockholder democracy. Each stockholder largely is dependent upon
the judgment of a majority of stockholders as to who should be the directors of
the corporation, what fundamental transactions (such as a merger) should be
undertaken, and what contractual terms should be specified among interested
parties with respect to the corporate arrangement (such as what provisions
should be in the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws). This model is
premised on the idea that all stockholders—either in the long or short run—
seek to maximize the value of the corporation. The use of classes of stock with
differing terms and powers can create conflicts among stockholders and render
stockholders distrustful of each other and corporate governance. Institutional
stockholders may have financial interests that may conflict with the interest of
others in maximizing the value of the corporation (such as relationships with
the corporation in addition to being a mere stockholder, or competing
investments). Finally, new derivative instruments may provide opportunities for
stockholders to benefit from the failure or lack of success of the corporation,
and those interests may be larger and more significant than the stockholders’
interest in the stock.
Game theory also postulates that communication is critical to the ability of a
social organization to realize the gains of non-zero-sum interactions. The
corporate laws and the federal securities law operate to promote
communications in certain respects. The corporate law allows stockholders to
obtain corporate books and records for certain purposes relevant to their
investment, and the securities laws mandate certain disclosures. Laws that
restrict a stockholders’ ability to obtain information may undermine
communication and, in turn, undermine the effectiveness of corporations. On
the other hand, more information is not necessarily better information. The
volume of information may be so burdensome that it becomes useless. In the
final analysis, the information that officers provide to boards and that boards
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provide to stockholders may be more effective by focusing boards and
stockholders, respectively, on the important issues and decisions, the salient
pros and cons, and the value judgments made in collecting and presenting the
information. In addition, volumes of information may render the situation more
opaque, not more transparent. Once the information is not trusted, the
relationship between the parties may become dysfunctional.
V
CONCLUSION
The corporate form was created and succeeded in a much simpler world
than the world of today. The increasing size and complexity of corporations and
the financial markets has created an increasing number of problems with
respect to the most efficient and fair form of organization, maintaining the trust
necessary for successfully functioning social organizations and markets, and
facilitating the flow of information and communication between interested
parties. These challenges may require experimentation with new forms of
organization to ascertain by trial and error what forms may best address these
issues. If evolutionary economics and game theory are correct, those new forms
that best address these issues ought to succeed in the long run. In addition, if
evolutionary economics is correct, the law would operate best by allowing
experimentation with respect to means, even if the law sets the ends desired and
imposes certain constraints. But the law also requires a modesty to
acknowledge its own limitations and a realization that the law is an imperfect
expression that requires careful and constant reconsideration. The sixtieth
anniversary of the MBCA is a perfect occasion for such reconsideration.

